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Shortly after his 2014 election victory Narendra Modi issued an invitation to global business. 
Speaking from one of Delhi’s much loved historical buildings he declared: “From the 
ramparts of the Red Fort, I would like to call people of the world to ‘come, make in India’” 
(International Business News 2014). This was a reflection of his electoral mandate. Modi and 
the BJP swept to power on the claims that he was the man to modernise India, to restore fast-
paced economic growth, to cut red tape and make the economy business-friendly.  
 
The corporate sector backed him to the hilt and he has delivered. The Modi government is 
business-friendly. Within a year in power it embarked on several major initiatives seeking to 
break down barriers for business. One important area of reform was labour law.  
 
Successive Indian governments have argued, backed by the World Bank, that India has one 
of the most rigid labour markets in the world, and that reforming the labour laws would lead 
to a major economic growth spurt. This, in turn, they claim would benefit labourers as more 
jobs - and more proper jobs - would become available; and welfare for all would improve.  
 
The previous Congress governments also tried to implement labour reforms but they baulked 
in the face of the political opposition (Roychowdhury 2015). Modi and the BJP, though, have 
been more bold. Labour unions and activists see his labour law reforms as the most serious 
attack on their rights for generations. Remarkably, all the major Unions, including the one 
affiliated to the BJP, called a one-day general strike against the reforms this autumn. But this 
opposition has not yet weakened Modi’s resolve to press ahead.  
 
The reforms going through parliament right now are controversial for three main reasons: 
 
1) They make it easier to lay off workers. To date only factories employing less than 100 
workers can make workers redundant without asking for government permission. The 
reforms would allow for dismissals without such permission for factories employing up to 
300 workers. 
 
2) They deregulate many more small factories. Factories with under 10 workers are already in 
the informal sector in the sense that they are exempt from most labour laws. The upper limit 
for informal factories will now be raised to 20 workers and factories below this threshold will 
be exempt from 14 labour laws, which worryingly include laws dealing with occupational 
safety, health and welfare of workers.  
 
3) They make it more difficult for trade unions to be officially recognised as a union 
representing workers in a factory. Such recognition is required to represent and bargain on 
behalf of the workers. Unions will now have to show that their membership covers 30% of 
the total workforce. This is up from 15%, a 100% increase.  
 
There are other changes as well. Social security for informal workers will be privatised, more 
overtime will be allowed, night shifts for women will be allowed, the number of outside 
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experts allowed in a union will be reduced, and so on. In addition, Rajasthan, Gujarat and 
other mainly BJP-ruled state governments are also pursuing similar reforms at state level 
(Secki 2015, Saha 2015, Mishra 2015). 
 
The general direction of the reforms is clear: increased deregulation and informalisation, 
weakening of unions, increased rights of management to control the size of the workforce as 
it sees fit; and increasing working hours. 
 
That said, most labourers have worse problems than this: for most labourers the labour laws 
have never provided any safeguards at all. A staggering 72% of the working population in the 
non-agricultural sectors are in informalised work (92% if agriculture is included). By this, 
what is commonly meant is that they have no labour contract, no employment rights and no 
access to social security. Most have no rights to organise in a Union. They are paid much less 
than the formal workers, most often two thirds to as little as a quarter of what formal workers 
are paid. The rather basic labour laws that are supposed to protect informalised workers – 
such as the Minimum Wages Act, the Migrant Workmen Act, the Unorganised Workers 
Social Security Act – are simply not implemented or ‘policed’ (NCEUS 2007). 
 
The informal workers are found in the huge informal sector but also in the formal sector. 
Astonishingly, fifty-eight per cent of all labour in the formal sector is informalised. Thirty-
four per cent of formal sector workers are not even employed directly by the factory but work 
for a labour contractor who supplies workers to factories (Institute for Human Development 
2014). They tend to be circular migrant labourers, with homes in far-flung villages and with 
no citizen rights such as access to government-subsidised food in the towns. Add to this very 
long working days – for example, in the Delhi garment industry, 10-12 hours in the slack 
season and 15-16 hours in the peak season – as well as pay below the stipulated minimum 
wage (Mezzadri & Srivastava 2015). To be informalised, to be outside the realm of labour 
laws, is no dance on roses. 
 
There are two arguments for watering down labour laws. The first is that such reforms would 
actually lead to more workers being formalised. This is based on the view that companies 
have been ‘forced’ to informalise their labourers, as the safeguards for the formally employed 
are too costly and act like a straitjacket; if regulations were pared down formal employment 
would increase (World Bank 2015).  But the first outcome of the present reforms is actually 
the opposite: we have seen a significant increase of informalisation with all factories 
employing 10-20 workers becoming informalised. And it is also not clear why employers 
would stop informalising labour unless formalised labour became just as cheap – and hence 
their conditions and pay became just as poor – as informalised ones. It is hard to see how 
worsening the conditions of formalised workers would benefit informalised labour.  
 
The other argument is that deregulation would unleash further economic growth. Companies 
would invest more willingly if they would not risk being stuck with too many employees on 
their books. To many this may sound plausible. But is it? – Might it not simply lead to a new 
wave of replacing formal workers with informalised contract workers?  
 
Moreover, is the dismissal protection really a major problem for India’s growth? Labour law 
scholars Deakin and Haldar (2015) show that although dismissal protection in India may be 
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high, China’s dismissal laws are stricter, after they were tightened in 2007. And other middle-
income countries are also tightening, not loosening their labour law. So, contrary to what is 
assumed in the Indian debate, India’s labour law changes go against present labour laws 
trends among its main competitors. Countries like China have strengthened their labour laws 
in order to improve the conditions and rights of their citizens.  
 
For many, the ultimate proof that the government prescriptions for economic growth will 
work lies in Modi’s track record in Gujarat. When he was Chief Minister there, and 
liberalised the economy, the state did experience high levels of economic growth. But not as 
high as its neighbouring state, Maharashtra, which did not follow a similar extreme 
deregulation strategy. So there are other ways of growing the economy. 
 
There is a good deal of ideology involved here. The idea that the economy does best if 
markets are freed from state interference belongs to the period of extreme market radicalism 
of the 1980s and early 1990s. Since then the international consensus has moved towards a 
focus on the role that institutions play for growth. Internationally respected figures such as 
Joseph Stiglitz argue that a market with no social control mechanisms, thus enabling big 
business to do what it wants, does not in itself create growth. What is needed is an 
institutional set-up geared towards growth, including geared towards making labour more 
productive. Deakin and Heldar (using Germany as a case in point) show that this may or may 
not include strong labour market regulations; what matters is that the whole institutional 
package that is applied. To enable companies to make more money by cheapening labour and 
restricting union activities is not sufficient to create growth; there also have to be incentives 
for companies to invest, and to invest in jobs and in training on the job for workers to make 
them more productive.  
 
Modi’s government states that it wants new jobs to be generated and that it wants to uplift the 
poor. The question is ‘how?’ For now it argues that the informal sector has ‘great potential 
for generating new jobs’ (Livemint 9/9/15).  It is correct that informalised job growth has 
tended to outstrip the growth of formalised jobs in India.  But the 69% of the Indian 
population who are classified as ‘poor and vulnerable’ (in 2009–10) are disproportionally 
found in the informalised economy (Kannan 2012). It is not clear how continued 
informalisation is the best way of improving their livelihoods, conditions and life chances. 
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